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Introduction 
Sexual harassment in the workplace is generally deplored, destructive of working 
relationships and unlawful. Despite this it is widespread and possibly on the 
increase. In Spain, according to a 2006 survey, 7,9% of women workers had been 
harassed by managers and colleagues during the previous 12 months.1 In the 
Netherlands the number of employees who had suffered sexual harassment by 
fellow-employees in the previous 12 months doubled from 2,5% in 2000 to 5,3% in 
2003.2 Why, despite all measures to discourage it, does it remain so disturbingly 
prevalent? 
 
An important clue lies in the reluctance of victims to come forward. In 1990 a survey 
showed that, while 76% of career women in South Africa had experienced sexual 
harassment during their working lives, most “would rather resign than ‘make a 
fuss’.”3 In Greece, according to a 2004 survey, 62.2% of women left their jobs within 
six months of suffering sexual harassment.4  
 
This, in turn, raises questions about the role of employers. Unwillingness to 
acknowledge sexual harassment, let alone act against (senior) perpetrators, appears 
to be common. In Greece, the same survey showed that in 67,5% of cases 
management was unaware of sexual harassment but, even when it was aware, no 
action was taken in 56.7% of cases.5 The same picture emerges from some of the 
cases discussed below. 
 
The role of employers, it is submitted, is crucial. The employer controls the 
workplace; sexual harassment cannot be combated effectively unless it takes the 
necessary action. In recent years the law has increasingly recognised the employer’s 
responsibility in this regard. In various systems, employers’ general liability for 
                                                 
1 Antonio Martín Artiles “Persistence of gender discrimination and sexual harassment at work” eironline (18-07-
2006) at www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/2006/06/articles/es0606039i.htm.  
2 Surveys by European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions Violence, bullying 
and harassment in the workplace (2003) available at www.eurofound.eu.int. at 16. See also Duncan Chappell 
and Vittorio Di Martino Violence at work (3rd ed) International Labour Office, Geneva (2006) available at 
www.ilo.ru/news/200606/e-book_small.pdf  
3 Lisa Dancaster “Sexual Harassment in the Workplace: Should South Africa Adopt the American Approach?” 
(1991) 12 Industrial Law Journal ( ‘ILJ’) 449. See also Rochelle le Roux, Thandi Orleyn & Alan Rycroft 
Sexual Harassment in the Workplace Durban: LexisNexis Butterworths (2005) at 7. 
4 Anda Stamati “First survey of sexual harassment in the workplace” eironline (30-07-2004) at 
http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/2004/07/feature/gr0407103f.htm. 
5 Ibid. 
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wrongful conduct by their employees (hereafter referred to as “employer liability”) 
has been extended expressly to include liability for acts of (sexual) harassment by 
their employees. The aim, clearly, is to persuade employers to be more vigorous in 
discouraging such conduct.  
 
It may be too early to judge the effectiveness of such measures. However, it is evident 
that the principle of employer liability brings with it a number of legal questions 
which, in practice, may often be contentious. For example – 
 What is the extent of the employer’s liability? Does it extend only to acts of sexual 
harassment committed within the workplace, or outside the workplace as well?  
 Should a distinction be drawn between cases where the perpetrator has been 
placed in authority over the victim as opposed to cases where the perpetrator and 
the victim are of equal standing?  
 Should employers’ liability for sexual harassment be regulated as part of their 
duty to ensure safe working conditions or as an aspect of the victim’s right to 
dignity and equal treatment?  
And, last but not least, 
 Should enforcement of the employer’s duty be at the instance of the victim of 
sexual harassment, in the form of a personal right of action against the employer, 
or is it primarily a responsibility of the state?  
 
These questions are considered below (not necessarily in the same order) and 
revisited in conclusion. In doing so the position in the Netherlands will be contrasted 
with that in South Africa, a country where legal development in this area has been 
exceptionally important. Following the abolition of minority rule in 1994, radical 
interventions were called for to deal with the legacy of centuries of injustice. While 
apartheid is forever synonymous with racism, institutionalised inequality had 
created a climate where every form of discrimination could flourish. Discriminatory 
treatment of women was especially pervasive, nowhere more so than in the 
workplace. The manner in which the new legal order has addressed the issue of 
discrimination in general, and sexual harassment in particular, is therefore worthy of 
note. 
 
A comparative approach 
It is trite that legal comparison must be approached with caution. Law is embedded 
in social structures and political power relations. This means, in the first place, that 
legal comparison should focus on concepts and on the “functions that institutions 
perform”6 rather than on institutions themselves. For this reason, too, individual 
employment law offers a more appropriate terrain for “transplanting” legal concepts 
than collective labour law.7  
                                                 
6 R. Blanpain & C. Engels (Eds) Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations in Industrialized Market 
Economies 7th ed The Hague: Kluwer Law International 2001 at 12. 
7 That is, to the extent that collective bargaining systems tend to be bound up with domestic power relations. See 
Bob Hepple ‘Can Collective Labour Law Transplants Work? The South African Example’ (1999) 20 ILJ 1 at 2–
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At the same time, as Kahn-Freund argued more than 30 years ago, 
“[i]ndustrialisation, urbanisation, and the development of communications have 
greatly reduced the environmental obstacles to legal transplantation”.8 Even in the 
least developed countries there had been “a tendency, stronger here, weaker there, 
and of course of varying velocity, to assimilate the law to that of the developed 
countries.”9 On this basis there can be little doubt that, with the onset of 
globalisation, the world has grown “even more amenable” to comparative labour law. 
Countries around the world, Willborn suggests,  
 
“although clearly unique and individual, are more similar than they ever have been 
before. Geography matters less, sociological and cultural differences are 
narrowing, and economic forces are becoming increasingly globalized. While 
important political and interest group differences still exist, we can draw on fast-
developing intellectual resources to help us sort through them.”10 
 
This reflects what has been termed the “convergence school” of comparative labour 
relations.11 In the case of South Africa, certainly, a process of convergence is strongly 
evident. Here we find a legal system rooted in the civil law traditions of Europe as 
well as English common law, with a body of labour law strongly influenced by 
international and European labour law, where the process of convergence has 
become increasingly systematic. South Africa’s Constitution,12 like its labour 
statutes,13 is based on the same international instruments that serve as sources of law 
in countries around the world.14 Similarly, in developing the common law South 
African courts continue to draw on the jurisprudence of other common law systems, 
while decisions of South African courts are referred to in those countries.15  
 
Also in defining employer responsibility for sexual harassment in the workplace, it 
will be seen, South African law is at a crossroads of international influences. All these 
factors suggest a fruitful basis for comparative study of South African legal 
development in this area. 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
3; Colin Fenwick & Evance Kalula “Law and Labour Market Regulation in East Asia and Southern Africa: 
Comparative Perspectives” The International Journal of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations 
(2005) 193 at 198–199. 
8 Sir Otto Kahn-Freund ‘On Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law’ (1974) 37 Modern Law Review 1 at 8–9, 
cited in Steven L. Willborn ‘Onward and Upward: The Next Twenty-Five Years of Comparative Labor Law 
Scholarship’ Comparative Labor Law and Policy Journal, 2003; 25 (1) 183 at 187. 
9 Ibid. For more discussion, see Blanpain & Engels op cit at 18–20. 
10Willborn op cit at 189. 
11 Blanpain & Engels op cit at 3–4. 
12 Chapter II of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
13 Thus, the drafters of South Africa’s Labour Relations Act of 1995 drew inter alia on Italian, UK, German and 
Dutch law in designing the post-apartheid labour dispensation: Hepple op cit at 2. 
14 In addition, the constitutions of countries such as Germany, Canada and India were referred to significantly by 
the drafters of the Constitution. 
15 See, for example, R  v. Headteacher and Governors of Denbigh High School [2006] UKHL 15. 
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Were similarities all that existed, however, legal comparison would have little 
purpose.16 If similarities create a common language, it is the differences between 
systems that provide the real substance of comparative study. Observing how 
problems are dealt with in other systems, as Blanpain puts it, “contributes to the 
better perception of one’s own national system” and “enriches one’s own approach to 
and understanding of industrial relations”.17 Importantly for present purposes, it 
may also indicate possible directions of future legal development.18  
 
The scope of employer liability 
Although the doctrine of employer liability was unknown in Roman law, it has found 
its way into many if not all legal systems. Over 100 years ago a leading South African 
judge observed:  
 
“The Roman-Dutch law recognises and adopts the principle, that a master or 
employer is liable for the injuries caused by his servants or workmen, within the 
scope of their employment. This general principle is also the law in England, 
Scotland, the United States of America, France, Belgium, Holland, Italy, Denmark 
and Norway.”19 
 
Despite its delictual (tortuous) nature, employer liability is “strict” (that is, not 
dependent on fault by the employer). This represents a fundamental departure from 
the rule that such liability arises from wrongful conduct on the part of the person 
held liable. In the late 19th century Pollock explained the rationale of employer 
liability as follows:  
 
“I am answerable … for the wrongs of my servant or agent, not because he is 
authorized by me or personally represents me, but because he is about my affairs, 
and I am bound to see that my affairs are conducted with due regard to the safety 
of others.”20 
 
The basis for this extended form of liability has always been seen as “considerations 
of social policy”21 rather than legal principle. Most important of these considerations, 
                                                 
16 As Ronnmar puts it: “A fundamental prerequisite for a meaningful comparison is the existence of important 
differences, but also basic similarities, between the countries subjected to study”: “Managerial Prerogative and 
the Employee's Obligation to Work: Comparative Perspectives on Functional Flexibility” (2006) 56 ILJ  [UK] 
35. 
17 Blanpain & Engels op cit at 4.  See, for example, Jane Aeberhard-Hodges “Sexual harassment in employment: 
Recent judicial and arbitral trends” International Labour Review Vol. 135 (1996), No. 5 at 499.  
18 Blanpain & Engels op cit at 6–7. For example, “one of the principal factors persuading Australia to move 
away from its historic practice of explicit discrimination against women was the existence of a “world wide 
trend towards equal pay for females””: Willborn op cit at 191, citing National Wage and Equal Pay Cases 1972, 
147 C.A.R. 172, 177–78 (1972).  
19 Per Kotze CJ in Lewis v The Salisbury Gold Mining Company (1894) OR 1 at 20; cited in Hirsch Appliance 
Specialists v Shield Security Natal (Pty) Ltd 1992 (3) SA 643 (D) at 648. 
20 Pollock Liability for the Torts of Agents and Servants (1885) 1 L.Q. Rev. 207 at 209, cited in R.G. McKerron 
The Law of Delict 2nd ed Cape Town: Juta (1939) at 99.   
21 McKerron op cit at 100. 
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as the House of Lords recently reiterated, is “the belief that a person who employs 
others to advance his own economic interest should in fairness be placed under a 
corresponding liability for losses incurred in the course of the enterprise”.22 In 
practice it is “best understood as a loss-distribution device”. Given that few 
employees could afford to pay substantial amounts of damages, it allows the victim of 
an employee’s wrongful conduct to recover damages from a party more likely to be 
able to pay – that is, the employee’s (possibly blameless) employer. 
 
The very fact that liability is strict, however, makes it all the more important to define 
its scope clearly. By definition, employer liability is based on the employment 
relationship. It follows, in Salmond’s much-quoted phrase, that “[a] master is not 
responsible for a wrongful act done by his servant unless it is done in the course of 
his employment”.23 Unfortunately, “course of employment” is hardly a precise 
concept. According to Salmond, an act is done in the course of employment “if it is 
either (a) a wrongful act authorised by the master or (b) a wrongful and unauthorised 
mode of doing some act authorised by the master.”24 In South Africa, similarly, the 
“standard test” of vicarious liability holds that an act done by an employee “solely for 
his own interests and purposes” falls outside the course of employment unless there 
is “a sufficiently close link” between the employee’s act and the employer’s 
business.25 Such a link will only be present if “at the relevant time the employee was 
about the affairs, or business, or doing the work of, the employer”; and “affairs of the 
employer”, in turn, “must relate to what the employee was generally employed or 
specifically instructed to do”.26 An employer may thus be liable even if the 
employee’s conduct was unauthorised provided that, in committing it, the employee 
was engaged in “an activity reasonably necessary” to achieve the employer's 
objectives. 
 
In its classic form, therefore, the doctrine hardly seems applicable to acts of sexual 
harassment by employees. Sexual harassment “authorised” by an employer will not 
only be exceptional but would make the employer directly liable. Typically, 
harassment is not only unauthorised but also prohibited, either expressly or by 
implication, and forms no part of “what the employee was generally employed or 
specifically instructed to do”. The employer’s obvious defence will be that the 
                                                 
22 Lister and Others v Hesley Hall Ltd [2001] UKHL 22 at par 65, with reference to Fleming The Law of Torts 
9th ed (1998) at 410. 
23 Salmond on Torts 1st ed (1907), cited in Lister v Hesley Hall at par 67 (above). The leading case in South 
Africa is Mkize v Martens 1914 AD 382. It may be noted that the terms “course” and “scope” of employment 
are often used interchangeably. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Minister of Police v Rabie 1986 (1) SA 117 (A) at 134. In K v Minister of Safety and Security [2005] 8 BLLR 
749 (CC) the Constitutional Court added an important qualification: in deciding whether a “sufficiently close” 
link existed,  “a court should consider the need to give effect to the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of 
Rights”: at par 32. 
26 Absa Bank Ltd v Bond Equipment (Pretoria) (Pty) Ltd (2001) 22 ILJ 95 (SCA) at par 5; emphasis added.  
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employee was not acting “in the scope of his employment” but was, to use the classic 
phrase, “on a frolic of his own”.27 
 
Codification of employer liability does not necessarily solve the problem since, in the 
last analysis, legislation must grapple with the same questions that the common law 
courts have been faced with. In terms of article 6:170 of the Dutch Civil Code an 
employer is liable for damage caused to a third party through wrongful conduct of a 
“subordinate” in the course of his or her employment, provided the possibility of 
such wrongful conduct was “increased” as a result of an instruction given by the 
employer.28 In practice this has been interpreted to mean that a “functional 
relationship” must exist between the employee’s duties and her or his wrongful 
conduct.29 This does not mean that the conduct must have formed part of those 
duties; even the fact that the employer could not have prevented it, or that the 
employee had disobeyed the employer’s instructions, does not in itself exonerate the 
employer.30 However, the existence of a “functional relationship” is a question of 
fact, and in practice “it is not impossible that a judge will consider that, although an 
employee did commit harassment or sexual intimidation, it was unrelated to the 
performance of his duties.”31 
 
Thus, where a man doing odd jobs for an employer committed sexual harassment, 
the court found that it was not his activities that brought him into contact with his 
victim but merely his presence in the workplace and, although he was “subordinate” 
to the employer, his actual duties did not increase the possibility of misconduct. The 
employer was therefore not liable.32 
 
It is against this background that the enactment of legislative measures dealing 
specifically with employer responsibility for sexual harassment in the workplace 
must be seen. In Europe the amendment of the Equal Treatment Directive33 in 2002 
provided a definition of “harassment” as well as “sexual harassment”, stigmatising 
both as “discrimination on the grounds of sex”.34 Employers, in terms of the new 
                                                 
27 Joel v Morison (1834) 6 C&P 501 at 503. 
28  Article 6:171 of the Code extends the employer’s liability to wrongful conduct by a “non-subordinate” (e.g., 
independent contractor) whilst doing work for the employer’s business. 
29 I. van der Putt-Van Vessem Aansprakelijkheid van Scholen Letselschadebureau Haaglanden BV at 
http://www.letselschadeforum.nl/Letselschade_Nieuws/Letselschade_Bureau_Haaglanden/Aansprakelijkheid_v
an_scholen_20060930139/. This may be compared to the requirement of a “sufficiently close link” between the 
employee’s act and the employer’s business in South Africa: see above. 
30 J.C.M. Bonnier “Aansprakelijkheid van de werknemer” at http://www.dakweb.nl/rh/96-9/96-9-35.htm. See 
also G.J.J. Heerma van Voss “Nieuw Burgerlijk Wetboek, vrouwen en arbeidsrecht” in A. Mattijssen (Ed) Het 
Nieuw Burgerlijk Wetboek & Vrouwen Amsterdam (1994) at 142; available at 
https://www.openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/bitstream/1887/3545/1/355_068.pdf. 
31 M.S.A. Vegter Vergoeding van psychisch letsel door de werkgever Sdu Uitgevers (2005) at 156; available at 
dare.ubvu.vu.nl/bitstream/1871/8967/1/boek_psychisch_letsel.pdf (translation by the present author). 
32 Judgment of the Rechtbank Arnhem of 4 July 2002 (Rb. Arnhem, 4 juli 2002, NJkort 2002, 52) as 
summarised in Van der Putt-Van Vessem op cit.  
33 Directive 76/207/EEC on the equal treatment of men and women, as amended by Directive 2002/73/EC. 
Implementation by member states was required by October 2005. 
34 Amended article 2.2 and 2.3. 
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article 2(5), are expected “to take measures to combat all forms of sexual 
discrimination and, in particular, to take preventive measures against harassment 
and sexual harassment in the workplace, in accordance with national legislation and 
practice.”  
 
Different states of the European Union have given effect to the Directive in different 
ways.35 In the Netherlands, articles 7:658 (safety at work), 7:646 (prohibition of 
discrimination between men and women) and 6:162 (general liability for wrongful 
acts ) of the Civil Code, read with the Working Conditions Act (WCA)36 and the Equal 
Treatment Act (ETA),37 provide a basis for holding employers liable for acts of sexual 
harassment by employees.38 The latter two statutes will be compared with their 
South African equivalents before looking more closely at recent developments in 
South Africa. 
 
Safety legislation 
In the Netherlands, although harassment is defined as a form of discrimination, 
employer liability for sexual harassment is regulated primarily in terms of the WCA. 
Article 3 of the statute requires employers to “ensure the safety and health of 
employees in relation to all aspects of the work process” and, as part of that duty, to 
implement a policy to “prevent or, if that is not possible, to limit psychosocial stress 
at work”. “Psychosocial stress” is defined as including sexual harassment.39 Case law 
has indicated that employers are expected to act “effectively” and “preventively” 
against sexual harassment and to penalise it.40 These duties are enforced by the 
labour inspectorate;41 thus, no personal remedy accrues to a complainant in the 
event of breach. However, article 7:658 of the Civil Code (a) requires the employer to 
manage the workplace in a such a way as may reasonably be necessary to prevent 
injury to employees, and (b) renders the employer liable for injury suffered by 
employees in the performance of their duties.42 European law moreover requires that 
                                                 
35 Twenty states, including the Netherlands, already had laws that made it possible to hold an employer liable 
for sexual harassment by an employee: see The Irish Presidency of the European Union in association with FGS 
Consulting and Professor Aileen McGolgan Report on Sexual Harassment In The Workplace in EU Member 
States (June 2004) Executive Summary at xiii–xiv; available at unece.org/gender/publications/Multi-
Country/SexualHarassmentReport.pdf.  
36 Arbeidsomstandighedenwet (Arbowet) of 1998, discussed below. Sexual harassment is also dealt with by the 
Regulation on Sexual Harassment of Civil Servants of 1994. 
37 Algemene Wet Gelijke Behandeling (AWGB) of 1994, discussed below. 
38 See also article 7:611 of the Civil Code, requiring employers and employees to conduct themselves as “good” 
employers and employees; cf judgment of Gerechtshof Leeuwarden dated 6 September 2000 (Case no 
9700469), available at http://www.vrouwenrecht.nl/modules/jurisprudention/?act=jur_info&vj_id=308. 
39 Article 1.3.e, WCA, effective as from 1 January 2007. “Sexual harassment” is no longer defined in the WCA 
but should be given the same meaning as in the ETA: Commissie Gelijke Behandeling Gelijke behandeling: 
oordelen en commentaar 2006 Utrecht: Willem-Jan van der Wolf (2007) at 60 (hereafter ‘Oordelenbundel’). 
40 Commissie Gelijke Behandeling Gelijke behandeling: oordelen en commentaar 2003 Deventer: Kluwer 
(2004) at 91.  
41 A victim of sexual harassment may therefore lodge a complaint with the labour inspectorate: see, for example, 
decision of Commissie Gelijke Behandeling dated 25 May 1999 (case no 99-48; CWI; RN 1999, nr. 1080) at par 
3.1. 
42 The employer can only escape liability by proving that it complied with this duty or that the damage was due 
to a significant extent to deliberate or reckless conduct of the employee: article 7:658.2. Liability may also arise 
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compensation awarded to victims of discrimination “must be adequate in relation to 
the damage sustained”.43 Member states must accordingly “ensure real and effective 
compensation or reparation … for the loss and damage sustained by a person injured 
as a result of discrimination … in a way which is dissuasive and proportionate to the 
damage suffered; such compensation or reparation may not be restricted by the 
fixing of a prior upper limit”.44 By way of the Civil Code, thus, victims of sexual 
harassment acquire a remedy for damages suffered. 
Recent court judgments and decisions of the Commission for Equal Treatment45 have 
clarified the content of the employer’s duty. The following points should be noted: 
 employers are expected to have a written policy for the prevention of sexual 
harassment that is adequate and clear, and to apply it properly when dealing with 
complaints;46 
 sexual harassment by a manager creates a presumption of employer liability, in 
that the manager exercises authority on behalf of the employer, whereas in the 
case of sexual harassment by a fellow-employee the test is whether the employer 
dealt properly with the complaint;47 and 
 if there is no adequate policy, the fact that sexual harassment by a manager takes 
place outside working hours is immaterial.48 
 
In South Africa the application of safety and health legislation in relation to sexual 
harassment is more problematic. As in the Netherlands, every employer is under a 
general duty to “provide and maintain, as far as is reasonably practicable, a working 
environment that is safe and without risk to the health of his employees”.49 There, 
however, the similarity ends. The South African statute focuses on the prevention of 
hazards arising from the performance of work and makes no mention of sexual 
harassment. Failure by an employer to comply with its statutory duties is a criminal 
offence50 and does not entitle an injured employee to seek damages from the 
employer; instead, compensation may be claimed from a state-administered fund in 
                                                                                                                                                        
from the conduct of third parties (for example, clients of the employer) to whom the employer entrusts the 
implementation of its duty: Meuffels v Ca-La HR 9 november 2001, RvdW 2001/157, JAR 2001/257, as 
discussed in J.M. Fleuren-van Walsem & G.J.J. Heerma van Voss Kroniek van hot social recht Afl. 2002/10 at 
http://www.njb.nl/NJB/mem/archief/art40210.html.  
43 Clause 18, Preamble to Directive 2002/73/EC. In principle, no distinction is drawn between physical and 
psychological injury: Marianne Gijzen The Netherlands Country Report on Measures to Combat Discrimination 
for the European Network of Legal Experts in the non-discrimination field (December 2004) at 
ec.europa.eu/employment_social/fundamental_rights/pdf/legnet/nlrep05_en.pdf, citing M.S.A Vegter 
“Aansprakelijkheid werkgever voor psychische schade werknemer als gevolg van seksuele intimidatie van de 
werknemer” in Aansprakelijkheid, Verzekering en Schade, nr. 5, October 2001 at 133-140, 134-135 where the 
relevant case law is discussed.  
44 Article 6.2, Directive 2002/73/EC.  
45 Commissie Gelijke Behandeling. For a detailed overview of its activities, see Commissie Gelijke Behandeling 
Hot verschil Gemaakt: Evaluatie AWGB en werkzaamheden CGB 1999-2004 (no date) available at 
www.cgb.nl/_media/downloadables/CGB%20evaluatie.pdf. 
46 CGB decisions 2006-36 and 2006-250, summarised at Oordelenbundel 74–75. See, for example, the sexual 
harassment policy of the University of Leiden at http://www.reglementen.leidenuniv.nl/index.php3?c=37. 
47 CGB decision 2006-250, ibid at 75. 
48 G v Van M BV Rechtbank Amsterdam (case no KG 01-79; judgment dated 22 February 2001).   
49 Section 8(1), Occupational Health and Safety Act 85 of 1993 (‘OHSA’). 
50 Section 38(1), OHSA. 
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respect of “disablement” (partial or complete) caused by accidents or diseases 
“arising out of and in the course of an employee’s employment”.51 Although such 
compensation is awarded on a no-fault basis, the system was clearly not designed for 
dealing with cases of sexual harassment. Most obviously, it is questionable whether a 
wrongful act can or should be regarded as an “accident”. Second, compensation is 
due only in respect of injuries that result in some form of “disablement”.52 Third, the 
amount of compensation is capped by various formulas applicable to different 
categories of injuries and diseases, based on the employee’s past earnings.53 Most 
importantly, section 35 of COIDA expressly abolishes the right of employees to claim 
(additional) damages from employers in respect of any occupational injury or 
disease.54  
 
These problems, it is submitted, are fundamental. In the context of sexual 
harassment, the net effect of section 35 would be to extend protection to employers 
rather than to victims. Certainly, employers faced with claims arising from sexual 
harassment by employees have been quick to invoke section 35; and, ominously, the 
Supreme Court of Appeal has observed in an obiter dictum that “[i] t may well be 
that employees who contract psychiatric disorders as a result of acts of sexual 
harassment to which they are subjected in the course of their employment can claim 
compensation under [COIDA]”.55 Significantly, however, the courts have managed to 
avoid applying this principle in all the matters that have so far come before them, 
albeit for reasons that are at best somewhat technical and, at worst, questionable. 
Thus, in one case it was ruled that an “accident” for purposes of COIDA means a 
specific incident whereas the plaintiff’s harassment had taken place over a period of 
time.56 In another case it was held (problematically) that the acts of sexual 
harassment did not arise in course of the “employment” of either the perpetrator or 
the victim.57 No less problematically, the Supreme Court of Appeal has found that 
injury caused by an act of harassment committed outside the workplace did not arise 
                                                 
51 Sections 1, 15, 22 and 65, Compensation for Occupational Injuries and Diseases Act 130 of 1993 (‘COIDA’). 
52 In the Netherlands an employee unable to work as a result of sexual harassment, even though not disabled for 
purposes of the WCA, is entitled to continued payment of wages in terms of article 7:628 of the Civil Code 
(dealing with inability to work for which the employer is responsible): see judgment of Rechtbank Rotterdam 
dated 27 November 2002 (Case no 43441) available at 
http://www.vrouwenrecht.nl/modules/jurisprudention/?act=jur_info&vj_id=493. 
53 Schedule 4, COIDA. Thus, even if compensation is due, it will not necessarily bear any relation to the damage 
suffered by the employee. The Act does provide for additional compensation if the employer was negligent but 
this, too, is limited to pecuniary loss: section 56, COIDA. For criticism, see MP Olivier, N Smit & ER Kalula 
Social Security: A Legal Analysis Durban: LexisNexis Butterworths (2003) at 480 and 485. It is submitted that 
article 6.2 of Directive 2002/73/EC (above) offers a more principled approach. 
54 In Jooste v Score Supermarket Trading (Pty) Ltd 1999 (2) BCLR 139 (CC) the Constitutional Court held that 
this limitation did not violate the right to equal treatment; a no-fault system of compensation funded by 
employers’ contributions, while excluding the employee’s right to claim damages, represented a rational 
legislative decision falling beyond the jurisdiction of the courts.  
55 Media 24 Ltd & another v Grobler [2005] 7 BLLR 649 (SCA) at par 77. 
56 Grobler v Naspers Bpk & another [2004] 5 BLLR 455 (C) at 528–529. In addition, the victim and the 
perpetrator had been employed by different legal entities within the same corporate group, thus precluding the 
perpetrator’s employer from relying on section 35 of COIDA. 
57 Ntsabo v Real Security CC [2004] 1 BLLR 58 (LC) at 96–97. 
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in the course of employment.58 Had it taken place inside the workplace, it is implied, 
such injury might have been regarded as the consequence of an “accident” covered by 
COIDA, thus excluding the employer’s liability.59  
 
Such an outcome would be highly problematic. In essence, it would equate a 
violation of an employee’s fundamental rights with a mere industrial accident. At the 
same time it would nullify the employer’s responsibility towards the victim by 
rendering it immune against claims arising from breach of its duty to protect her 
dignity. The point is that preventing sexual harassment not just about safety at work; 
it is about combating sex discrimination. For this reason, it is submitted, legislation 
implementing the right to equal treatment creates a more appropriate framework for 
dealing with sexual harassment.  
 
Equality legislation 
In the Netherlands, Directive 2002/73 resulted in amendments to article 7:646 of the 
Civil Code and to the ETA expressly prohibiting harassment and sexual 
harassment.60 Paragraph 6 of the former now provides that the general prohibition of 
direct discrimination includes harassment and sexual harassment. The new article 1a 
of ETA similarly states that discrimination for purposes of the statute includes 
harassment. In one of the first interpretations of article 1a by the Commission for 
Equal Treatment, failure by the directors of a company to take measures to prevent a 
sexually intimidating atmosphere in the workplace was held to be a contravention of 
article 1a and, therefore, of article 7:646.61 
 
In South Africa the former Industrial Court accepted that “sexual harassment is a 
form of sexual discrimination”,62 while the former Labour Appeal Court termed it “an 
egregious invasion of [the victim’s] employment security and her dignity”.63 In both 
cases it was accepted that an employer is under a duty to protect its employees 
against sexual harassment in the employment relationship. The interim Constitution 
                                                 
58 Fn 55 above.  
59 Post-traumatic stress disorder arising from working conditions has been accepted as an occupational injury or 
disease which is therefore subject to COIDA: see Urquhart v Compensation Commissioner [2006] 1 BLLR 96 
(E); Odayar v Compensation Commissioner (2006) 27 ILJ 1477 (N). 
60 Act of 5 October 2006 in Staatsblad van het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden dated 17 October 2006, with effect 
from 18 October 2006: Oordelenbundel at 59–60. See also Minister van Sociale Zaken Memorie van toelichting 
op wetsvoorstel Wijziging van de Wet gelijke behandeling van mannen en vrouwen en het Burgerlijk Wetboek 
ter uitvoering van Richtlijn 2002/73/EG (12 september 2005) at 
http://home.szw.nl/navigatie/dossier/dsp_dossier.cfm?set_id=340&doctype_id=226#7066600. 
61 CGB decision 2006-250, Oordelenbundel (2006) at 75. Like the WCA, the ETA does not place any personal 
right of action at the disposal of a victim of discrimination; such claims must be brought in terms of the 
appropriate provisions of the Civil Code. Enforcement in terms of the ETA proceeds by way of complaints to 
the Commissie Gelijke Behandeling (Equal Treatment Commission) which may issue advisory awards or 
institute legal action: see sections 13–15, ETA. 
62 J. v M. Ltd (1989) 10 ILJ 755 (IC) at 757—758. The Industrial Court had been established in terms of the 
(previous) Labour Relations Act 28 of 1956 with jurisdiction to determine “unfair labour practices”, a concept 
broad enough to include sexual harassment: in general, see Alan Rycroft & Barney Jordaan A Guide to South 
African Labour Law 2nd ed Cape Town: Juta (1992) chapter 3. 
63 Intertech Systems (Pty) Ltd v Sowter (1997) 18 ILJ 689 (LAC) at 705. 
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of 1993, followed by the final Constitution of 1996, entrenched the right to equality 
and placed a general prohibition on all forms of “unfair” discrimination, including 
sex discrimination.64 Separate statutes have been enacted to implement these 
provisions inside and outside the employment context.65 Within the employment 
context the Employment Equity Act66 establishes an integrated complex of rights and 
duties giving effect to the right to equality. On the one hand it prohibits unfair 
discrimination against employees in any employment policy or practice;67 on the 
other hand it requires “designated employers”68 to implement employment equity 
plans which must, inter alia, contain measures to “identify and eliminate 
employment barriers, including unfair discrimination, which adversely affect people 
from designated groups.”69 The Act expressly provides that “[h]arassment of an 
employee is a form of unfair discrimination and is prohibited on any one, or a 
combination of grounds of unfair discrimination listed in subsection (1)”.70  
 
Employer liability is regulated by two mechanisms. First, section 60 of the Act states 
that an  employer will be held co-responsible for any contravention of the Act (thus, 
including sexual harassment) by an employee “while at work” unless, after consulting 
“all relevant parties”, it takes “the necessary steps to eliminate the alleged conduct”. 
Liability can also be avoided by proving that the employer did “all that was 
reasonably practicable” to prevent the contravention.71 In addition, any 
contravention must “immediately be brought to the attention of the employer”.72 
Should a dispute reach the Labour Court the onus is on the employer to show that no 
unfair discrimination took place.73 No limit is placed on the amount of compensation 
and/or damages that may be awarded to a victim.74 
                                                 
64 Section 9(3) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, prohibits discrimination on 17 listed 
grounds, including sex and gender, as well as any other ground involving an analogous infringement of human 
dignity. These various forms of prohibited discrimination are collectively referred to as “unfair discrimination”.  
65 Section 9(4) of the Constitution required the enactment of legislation “to prevent or prohibit unfair 
discrimination”.  
66 Act 55 of 1998 (‘EEA’). The Act was influenced to a significant degree by the Canadian Employment Equity 
Act of 1995. Discrimination outside the employment relationship is dealt with by the Promotion of Equality and 
Prohibition of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 2000 (known as the “Equality Act”). 
67 Section 6(1), EEA. 19 prohibited grounds of discrimination are listed, including sex and gender. In addition, 
section 5 places a general duty on all employers “to [eliminate] unfair discrimination in any employment policy 
or practice,” which includes “the working environment and facilities”: section 1, EEA. 
68 In practice, “designated employers” are those in the public sector as well as medium to large employers in the 
private sector: see section 1 read with Schedule 4. 
69 Section 15(2)(a), EEA. “Designated groups” is defined as “black people, women and people with disabilities”. 
“Black people” is defined as “Africans, Coloureds and Indians”: section 1, EEA. 
70 Section 6(3), EEA. 
71 See, for example, Mokoena & another v Garden Art (Pty) Ltd & another [2008] JOL 21227 (LC) where the 
employer was found not liable in that its conduct had met this requirement. 
72 Section 60(1). In Ntsabo v Real Security [2004] 1 BLLR 58 (LC) “immediately” was interpreted as meaning 
“within a reasonable time in the circumstances”: at p 91. This interpretation has been adopted by the Code of 
Good Practice (fn 75 below): see item 8.1.2. 
73 Section 11, EEA. Article 7:646.8 of the Dutch Civil Code has a similar effect. 
74 Section 50(1), EEA. See, for example, Christian v Colliers Properties [2005] 5 BLLR 479 (LC). For 
comment, see Alan Rycroft “Compensating the Harassed Employee” Paper presented to 17th Annual Labour 
Law Conference (Johannesburg, 2004) available at 
http://www.lexisnexis.co.za/ServicesProducts/presentations/17th/AlanRycroft.doc. 
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The action expected of employers in preventing and dealing with sexual harassment 
is spelled out in the Amended Code of Good Practice on the Handling of Sexual 
Harassment Cases in the Workplace.75 “Sexual harassment” is defined extensively.76 
The employer’s fundamental responsibility is to “create and maintain a working 
environment in which the dignity of employees is respected”.77 This includes 
adopting a sexual harassment policy as well as defined procedures for reporting and 
dealing with complaints.78   
 
Alternatively, it is possible that – at least in many cases – measures to prevent sexual 
harassment may be enforced by the labour inspectorate using its administrative 
powers. “Designated” employers79 are under a duty to draw up and implement 
employment equity plans which must include, inter alia, measures to eliminate 
unfair discrimination – in other words, including sexual harassment.80 The labour 
inspectorate has extensive powers to enforce these provisions, including the power to 
seek court orders.81 The Labour Court has held in a number of cases that these 
administrative procedures are exclusive; in other words, employees have no personal 
right to seek the enforcement of affirmative action measures in their own favour.82 
However, it is inconceivable that the right of employees to enforce the fundamental 
right enshrined in section 6 of the EEA, by claiming damages arising from an 
employer’s failure to take measures to eliminate sexual harassment, could be 
precluded on this basis. Although it has yet to be confirmed by the courts, it is 
submitted that a victim of sexual harassment may lodge a complaint with the labour 
inspectorate while, at the same time, instituting legal action against the perpetrator 
and/or the employer in terms of section 60.  
 
                                                 
75 GN 1357 of 4 August 2005; available at http://www.workinfo.com/free/Sub_for_legres/data/equity/ 
cgpsh2.htm. A Code of Good Practice is not a source of law but serves as a guide to the interpretation of law. In 
the Netherlands, while broad guidelines for employers have been formulated, no similar code has been 
published: Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid “Seksuele intimidatie: informatie voor 
werkgevers” at http://home.szw.nl/navigatie/dossier/dsp_dossier.cfm?set_ id=102&link_id=5498#463300. The 
WCA regulations published by the labour inspectorate (Arbobesluit: integrale versie geldig vanaf 1 januari 
2007) do not deal expressly with sexual harassment: see article 2.15 at 
http://www.arbo.nl/onbekend/onbekend/algemeen/szw-documenten/Wetten/docs/arbobesluit-integrale-versie-
januari-2007-doc.pdf do. 
76 In essence, sexual harassment is characterised as “unwelcome conduct of a sexual nature that violates the 
rights of an employee and constitutes a barrier to equity in the workplace”: item 4. Its various defining features 
are explained more fully in item 5. 
77 Item 6. 
78 Item 8. 
79 In essence, medium to large employers in the private sector and all employers in the public sector: see section 
1, EEA. 
80 Sections 15(2)(a) and 20(2)(b), EEA. Measures to prevent unfair discrimination are included under 
“affirmative action measures”. 
81 See Chapter V Part A, EEA. 
82 Dudley v City of Cape Town & another [2004] 5 BLLR 413 (LC); Cupido v GlaxoSmithKline South Africa 
(Pty) Ltd [2005] 6 BLLR 555 (LC). 
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And yet, in practice, very few claims involving sexual harassment have been brought 
against employers83 and, of these, only one has been based on section 60.84 The 
applicant in this matter was a female security guard who, after suffering prolonged 
harassment by her supervisor, was driven to resign by the employer’s 
unresponsiveness to her complaints. Her claim of unfair dismissal,85 combined with 
a claim of unfair discrimination, was successful. While certain aspects of the 
judgment are open to question,86 it leaves no doubt that in circumstances such as 
these section 60 of the EEA offers an effective remedy to victims of sexual 
harassment.  
 
As noted above, however, section 60 applies only to harassment perpetrated in the 
“workplace” by an “employee” of the victim’s employer – in other words, a fellow-
employee.87 Where either of these factors is absent, section 60 will not apply.88 To 
hold an employer liable under such circumstances it is therefore necessary to go 
beyond section 60.89 Two mechanisms developed by the South African courts to 
extend the employer’s liability are discussed below: (a) application or development of 
a common law remedy, and (b) direct enforcement of the victim’s constitutional right 
to equality. 
 
 
 
                                                 
83 Le Roux et al list 61 reported cases between 1989 and 2004 dealing with sexual harassment, most of them 
post-1998 (op cit at 133–134). Many were brought by perpetrators dismissed for sexual harassment challenging 
the fairness of their dismissal. One possible explanation for the lack of claims against employers is that cases of 
sexual harassment are increasingly being resolved by means of internal procedures (see above). It is also likely 
that many disputes are settled through conciliation before they reach court: cf Ronald Bernikow “10 Years of the 
CCMA – An Assessment for Labour” (2007) 11 Law, Democracy & Development (Special Edition) 13, 
especially at 20–21.  
84 Ntsabo v Real Security CC [2004] 1 BLLR 58 (LC). 
85 “Dismissal” is defined in the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 (‘LRA’) as including termination of 
employment by an employee where the employer has made continued employment “intolerable”: section 
186(1)(e), LRA.  
86 In particular, the finding that the applicant’s dismissal was unfair but not “automatically unfair” (i.e., based on 
a prohibited ground such as sex discrimination) has been criticised. In the later case of Christian v Colliers 
Properties [2005] 5 BLLR 479 (LC) an employee who was forced to resign as a result of sexual harassment was 
awarded compensation for automatically unfair dismissal in terms of the LRA as well as damages for unfair 
discrimination in terms of the EEA. For a comparable decision in the Netherlands, see judgment of Rechtbank 
Rotterdam dated 30 September 1999 (Case no 103099/HA ZA 98-2312) available at 
http://www.vrouwenrecht.nl/modules/jurisprudention/?act=jur_info&vj_id=154. 
87 Le Roux et al op cit at 94–96; Benita Whitcher “Two Roads to an Employer's Vicarious Liability for Sexual 
Harassment: S Grobler v Naspers Bpk en ‘n Ander and Ntsabo v Real Security CC” (2004) 25 ILJ 1907 at 1921. 
In the Netherlands, the more general wording of article 3 of the Arbowet appears to avoid this difficulty. 
88 In addition, “the employer will only be liable if it fails to take the necessary steps to eliminate harassment 
after it has been brought to its attention”: Rochelle le Roux  “Sexual harassment in the workplace” (2004) 25 
ILJ 1897 at 1898 at 1906. Liability for permitting sexual harassment to take place can thus be avoided by taking 
appropriate action after it is reported. 
89 In principle, South African courts are prepared to recognise general common law remedies even where 
specific statutory remedies exist to the extent that the former are not abolished expressly or by necessary 
implication: Fedlife Assurance Ltd v Wolfaardt [2001] 12 BLLR 1301 (SCA). Thus, the EEA does not exclude 
the right of a victim of sexual harassment to hold her employer liable in delict (tort): Media 24 Ltd & another v 
Grobler [2005] 7 BLLR 649 (SCA) at pars 75–76. See also Orr & another v Unisa [2004] 9 BLLR 954 (LC) at 
pars 13–17. 
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Applying or developing the common law 
Section 8(3) of the Constitution mandates the courts to give effect to a basic right by 
applying, or if necessary developing, the common law “to the extent that legislation 
does not give effect to that right”.90 In addition, section 39(2) states that, when doing 
so or when interpreting any legislation, a court “must promote the spirit, purport and 
objects of the Bill of Rights”.  
 
A landmark case in the development of the doctrine of the employer’s vicarious 
liability was Grobler v Naspers Bpk & another.91 In this matter the plaintiff had 
suffered severe sexual harassment at the hands of a trainee manager (Samuels) who 
was, however, employed by another company within the same corporate group. Since 
this precluded her from relying on section 60 of the EEA, the victim therefore 
proceeded against Samuels’s employer in terms of the common law doctrine of 
vicarious liability. According to the “standard test” for employer liability (see above) 
she had little chance of success. The court, however, ruled that the doctrine should be 
interpreted afresh in the light of its evolution in a number of foreign jurisdictions.92 
From the judgment of the Canadian Supreme Court in Bazley v Curry93 Nel J 
extracted the principle that “[v]icarious liability was always concerned with policy 
considerations that have changed over the centuries and represented a compromise 
between the social interest in providing an innocent victim of a wrongful act with a 
remedy against a financially strong defendant and a concern that unreasonable 
burdens are not placed on enterprises”.94 He went on to cite Bazley as follows: 
 
“[Courts] should openly confront the question of whether liability should lie 
against the employer, rather than obscuring the decision beneath semantic 
discussions of ‘scope of employment’ and ‘mode of conduct’.… The fundamental 
question is whether the wrongful act is sufficiently related to conduct authorized 
by the employer to justify the imposition of vicarious liability. … Once engaged in a 
particular business, it is fair that an employer be made to pay the generally 
foreseeable costs of that business. …In determining the sufficiency of the 
connection between the employer’s creation or enhancement of the risk and the 
wrong complained of, subsidiary factors may be considered. These may vary with 
the nature of the case [but include] the extent of power conferred on the employee 
in relation to the victim [and] the vulnerability of potential victims to wrongful 
exercise of the employee’s power.”95 
                                                 
90 See also section 173 of the Constitution, providing for the power of superior courts to develop the common 
law, and  
91 [2004] 5 BLLR 455 (C).  
92 The reported judgment (in Afrikaans) runs to over 70 pages, citing numerous decisions from Australia, 
Canada, New Zealand, the UK and the USA. A summary appears in Whitcher op cit. 
93 174 DLR (4th) 45, at pp 514–517 of the judgment. Much attention was also given to the House of Lords 
judgment in Lister v Hesley Hall Ltd. [2001] UKHL 22: see pp 517–520 of the judgment and Douglas Brodie 
“Enterprise Liability: Justifying Vicarious Liability” Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 2007 27 (493). 
94 At 515. 
95 At 516–517. 
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Nel J ultimately found for the plaintiff on the basis that “even without applying the 
‘supervisor’ test96 ... Naspers would be liable since the employment relationship 
created or increased the risk of harassment.”97 Even if he was wrong in this finding, 
the learned judge held, he would be justified in developing the common law rule in 
accordance with various provisions of the Bill of Rights to hold Naspers vicariously 
liable.98  
 
The judgment has been criticised on various grounds, inter alia that it “[elevates] the 
ratio for vicarious liability to the test for vicarious liability”99 and that “vicarious 
liability in the context of sexual harassment is being approached differently 
compared to other circumstances”.100 To avoid these and other problems, Le Roux 
argues for further development of the “standard test” in the light of the Constitution 
by focusing on the concept of “course of employment” rather than “risk of 
enterprise”. These questions are returned to below. Suffice it to note that it is 
debatable whether the above judgment did, in fact, go beyond the limits of the 
standard test. “Stated differently,” Whitcher suggests,  
 
“there was a sufficiently close connection between the wrongful acts and the job 
Samuels was authorized to perform. Using that line of reasoning, the court was 
able to find, for policy reasons, that it would be fair and just to hold Naspers 
vicariously liable”.101  
 
These contrasting interpretations underline the danger of slipping into subtle if not 
semantical distinctions when applying different concepts to the same facts. It is 
noteworthy that, when the matter went on appeal, the Supreme Court of Appeal – 
notwithstanding its own formulation of the standard test (above) – declined to rule 
on the employer’s argument that Nel J had been wrong in his interpretation of the 
doctrine.102 By then, it should be noted, Samuels’s employer (Media 24) had assumed 
liability on behalf of its subsidiary (Naspers), thus enabling the court to find that the 
employer had failed in its common law duty to provide the victim with a safe working 
environment. It was clear, the court held, that “the legal convictions of the 
community require an employer to take reasonable steps to prevent sexual 
harassment of its employees in the workplace and to … compensate the victim for 
harm caused thereby should it negligently fail to do so.”103 By failing to take action to 
deter Samuels at an earlier stage the employer had breached this duty.  
 
                                                 
96 In terms of which an employer is liable for harm caused by an employee in the course of exercising 
supervisory authority: see Faragher v City Boca Raton 524 US 775 (1998); Burlington Industries Inc v Ellerth 
524 US 742 (1998), as discussed by Whitcher op cit at 1913–1915. 
97 At 526; translation by the author.  
98 At 527. 
99 Le Roux et al op cit at 89; see also Whitcher op cit at 1908–1909.  
100 Le Roux op cit at 1902–1903.  
101 Op cit at 1919. 
102 At par 63. 
103 At par 68. 
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Relying directly on the Constitution 
Both the above judgments demonstrate the flexibility of the common law in 
fashioning remedies where, for technical reasons, statutory protection of basic rights 
may be lacking.104 There are, however, situations where the common law may offer 
no remedy which the court finds capable of being applied or developed for this 
purpose. In such cases it is possible to invoke the constitutional right itself, albeit 
only as a last resort.105 The question therefore arises to what extent constitutional 
rights – in particular, to equality or dignity – may be relied on in cases of sexual 
harassment where neither section 60 of the EEA nor the corresponding common law 
remedies are applicable. 
 
The Labour Court was recently faced with a situation of this nature in Piliso v Old 
Mutual Life Assurance Co (SA) Ltd & others.106 The applicant , after suffering sexual 
harassment in the form of odious notes affixed to her workstation by an unknown 
perpetrator, instituted action against her employer in terms of section 60 of the EEA 
while also alleging, in the alternative (a) failure by the employer to provide a safe 
working environment and (b) violation of her constitutional rights.107 Section 60 of 
the EEA, the court found, did not apply because there was no evidence that the 
perpetrator was an employee of the employer. Nor, given the unforeseeable nature of 
the harassment, could it be said that the employer had failed in its duty to provide a 
safe working environment. The employer’s culpability, it was held, arose from the 
inadequacy of its response to the employee’s plight which, in effect, amounted to a 
breach of the employee’s constitutional right to fair labour practices.108 Although the 
matter has not been taken on appeal, it remains to be seen whether this approach 
will be endorsed in future cases. 
 
From “employer liability” to “enterprise liability” 
To sum up: in South Africa as well as the Netherlands special rules have been 
enacted to regulate employer liability for sexual harassment in the workplace. In the 
Netherlands, while such liability is expressly regulated by the WCA, employees may 
                                                 
104 “[T]he genius of the common law is that the first statement of a common-law rule or principle is not its final 
statement. The contour of rules and principles expand and contract with experience and changes in social 
conditions. The law in this area has been and should continue to be sufficiently flexible to adapt to changing 
social conditions”: per McHugh J in  Hollis v Vabu Pty Ltd [2001] 207 CLR 21, cited in Grobler v Naspers Bpk 
& another [2004] 5 BLLR 455 (C) at 521. See also Sir Bob Hepple ‘The Common Law and Statutory Rights’: 
3rd Hamlyn Lecture (2004) available at http://ucl.ac.uk/laws/hamlyn/hamlyn04_3.pdf. at 15; now published in 
Hepple Rights at Work: Global, European and British perspectives Sweet and Maxwell (2005). 
105 “[A]n Act of Parliament [cannot] simply be ignored and reliance placed directly on a provision in the 
Constitution, nor is it permissible to side-step an Act of Parliament by resorting to the common law”: Phillips 
and Others v National Director of Public Prosecution 2006 (2) BCLR 274 (CC) at par 51. See also Bato Star 
Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism and Others 2004 (7) BCLR 687 (CC) at par 
22; Minister of Health and Another NO v New Clicks South Africa (Pty) Ltd and Others 2006 (2) SA 311 (CC) 
at pars 434–437. 
106 [2007] JOL 18897 (LC).  
107 In particular, section 23(1) of the Constitution, which states that “[e]veryone has the right to fair labour 
practices”. 
108 At pars 81, 89. For comparative analysis of employer liability in the context of the employee’s right to 
privacy, see Debbie Collier “Workplace Privacy in the Cyber Age” (2002) 23 ILJ 1743.  
17 
 
also have remedies in terms of the ETA (which applies both inside and outside the 
workplace) and article 6:170 of the Civil Code. In South Africa the position is 
different in several ways: 
 COIDA, in regulating safety at work, offers no express remedy to victims of sexual 
harassment and excludes employer liability for injury suffered; 
 the common law right to safe working conditions gives a clear remedy to victims 
of sexual harassment; 
 the Equality Act (unlike the ETA) does not apply to employees, therefore only the 
EEA is applicable to sexual harassment in the workplace; 
 general employer liability is regulated in terms of common law rather than 
statute; and  
 all law is subject to the Bill of Rights, which may also be relied on directly where 
both statute and common law are silent.  
 
The diversity of the rules applicable to sexual harassment creates a degree of 
uncertainty. Litigants will obviously rely on the cause of action that best fits their 
claim while the courts, certainly in South Africa, have been more concerned with 
crafting remedies than with working out a consistent approach. Given the variety of 
circumstances in which sexual harassment may take place, it is certainly appropriate 
that protection should be as broad as possible. Different remedies, however, imply 
different criteria, thus creating scope for technical argument and variable outcomes. 
An employer’s general (vicarious) liability, for example, has traditionally depended 
on wrongful conduct by an employee acting “in the course of” employment. Statutory 
liability for sexual harassment, on the other hand, depends on failure by the 
employer to take either preventive or remedial action; moreover, it extends only to 
harassment of the employer’s own employees. Are there any unifying principles that 
may inform the various rules as a basis for a more harmonious approach? 
 
It is submitted that two such principles can be identified. First, it is recognised both 
in Europe and in South Africa that sexual harassment is a form of discrimination. 
This implies that protection against sexual harassment must be understood as an 
assertion of the right to equality, regardless of the legal rule relied on by the victim.109 
This, in turn, means that derogations from that right must be construed 
restrictively110 – in other words, the employer’s defence must be interpreted 
narrowly, not only when a sexual harassment claim is brought in terms of equality 
                                                 
109 It is submitted that this factor also justifies treating vicarious liability for sexual harassment differently, and 
more stringently, than in respect of wrongful conduct by employees not involving the violation of fundamental 
rights: see above. 
110 See, for example, Johnston v Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary [1986] ECR 1651 (ECJ); 
Matinkinca and Another v Council of State, Ciskei and Another 1994 (1) BCLR 17 (Ck); Kauesa v Minister of 
Home Affairs, Namibia and Others 1995 (11) BCLR 1540 (NmS). 
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legislation but also when the victim relies on her right to safe working conditions or 
seeks to hold the employer vicariously liable.111 
 
Secondly, employer liability in all its various forms is ultimately bound up with the 
same policy consideration – that is, the employer’s responsibility not only to its 
employees but also to third parties for injury caused by those who carry out its work. 
With the huge growth of corporate power and the scope of companies’ operations in 
recent decades this principle has taken on special significance. It is underlined by the 
development of a broader notion of corporate social responsibility (CSR) during the 
same period – the employer’s responsibility,112 that is, not only for the conduct of its 
employees but also for the impact of its operations on the environment and on 
society at large.113 The fact that CSR norms are essentially voluntary114 does not 
detract from their significance as points of reference, and possibly guidelines, for 
legal development. Norms that are voluntary in one country may be legally binding 
in another; similarly, non-binding norms may become legally binding.115 The 
evolution of the doctrine of vicarious liability itself may be seen as an illustration of 
this process. Even more pertinent, it is submitted, is the “risk of enterprise” doctrine 
as enunciated in the Bazley judgment and given legal effect in Grobler v Naspers 
(above).116 Arguably, this approach goes a long way towards addressing the problems 
of “employer liability” outlined above and, for this reason, deserves closer 
consideration.  
 
Enterprise responsibility does not depend on any specific conduct of the perpetrator 
or the employer; it arises from the very act of carrying on an enterprise. “The 
workplace”, as the UK Court of Appeal has explained, “is the very place where 
harassment is often encountered and from which its victim is often powerless to 
                                                 
111 Thus, “in the course of employment” should be interpreted broadly in the context of a sexual harassment 
claim based on the employer’s vicarious liability in order to give the fullest possible protection to the 
employee’s right to equal treatment which is actually at issue. 
112 In principle, it is submitted, social responsibility should be expected not only of companies but of employers 
in general. As Davies & Freedland point out, even “[t]he individual employer represents an accumulation of 
material and human resources” (op cit at 17), thus assuming a “social” nature. 
113 “Corporate social responsibility (CSR) is a concept whereby companies integrate social and environmental 
concerns in their business operations and in their interaction with their stakeholders on a voluntary basis”: 
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and the European Economic and 
Social Committee Implementing the Partnership for Growth and Jobs: Making Europe a Pole o f Excellence on 
Corporate Social Responsibility COM(2006) Brussels, 22.3.2006 at 1: available at 
ec.europa.eu/employment_social/soc-dial/csr/index.htm.  
114 An aspect that has, however, been much criticised: cf Stephen Gardner “CSR in the EU - An alliance to 
narrow divisions?” Ethical Corporation (February 2007) available at http://www.mvo-
platform.nl/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=181&Itemid=45&lang=nl_NL. 
115 For example, the ILO Tripartite Declaration calls on multinational companies to “promote equality of 
opportunity and treatment in employment” in all their operations: see clause 22, Tripartite Declaration of 
Principles concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy International Labour Office, Geneva: 4th 
edition, 2006. The recent amendments to the Dutch ETA and WCA, in accordance with Directive 2002/73/EC, 
have turned this guideline into a legal duty as far as the prevention of sexual harassment is concerned. 
116 For an overview, see Grobler v Naspers Bpk & another [2004] 5 BLLR 455 (C) at 508–526; Whitcher op cit 
at 1915–1917. For criticism, see Le Roux et al op cit at 89–91. 
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escape. It is thus often likely to be a risk incidental to employment.”117 Nor does 
enterprise liability depend on the existence of an employment relationship between 
the perpetrator and the employer. Rather, “the employer should also be responsible 
for the activities of contractors (even if they are ‘genuinely’ self-employed) in 
situations where they can be regarded as engaged in the conduct of his enterprise”.118  
At least conceptually, it is submitted, the various forms of employer liability 
discussed above could be harmonised on this basis. Doing so would shift the focus of 
inquiry towards a single question: was there a sufficiently close connection between 
the perpetrator’s conduct and the conduct of the enterprise?119 The likely effect would 
be to narrow the scope for technical defences and, hence, a broadening of employer 
liability. It would, however, stop well short of absolute liability. As the court in 
Bazley observed, “‘mere opportunity’ to commit a tort, in the common ‘but-for’ 
understanding of that phrase, does not suffice”.120 The requirement of a “sufficiently 
close” connection, arguably, preserves a balance of fairness by absolving the 
employer of liability for conduct falling beyond the perpetrator’s connection with the 
enterprise.  
 
As noted already, the notion of enterprise liability has been criticised on a number of 
grounds. Most importantly, it has been argued, “in terms of Naspers vicarious 
liability will not be imposed where sexual harassment occurs in a low or no risk or 
equal relationship”.121 Moreover, all the key cases relied on in that judgment “dealt 
with very special responsibilities, which included the (almost parental) care of 
children and other vulnerable people”. This raises the question “whether the risk [of 
sexual harassment] identified in Naspers is really comparable”.122 Instead, Le Roux 
suggests, it may be preferable to “develop the traditional test,123 rather than to find a 
relationship involving subordination or to rely on a construction (like enterprise risk) 
that may sometimes undermine the policy considerations vicarious liability attempts 
to serve”.  
 
In fact, “enterprise risk” may be a broader and more flexible concept than the above 
criticism would suggest. Subordination of the victim to the perpetrator, for example, 
is just one of an open-ended series of factors considered by the court in Bazley (and 
                                                 
117 Majrowski v Guy's & St Thomas's NHS Trust [2005] IRLR 340 at 350. 
118 Douglas Brodie “Enterprise Liability: Justifying Vicarious Liability” Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 2007 
27 (493). An entrepreneur’s liability for damage caused by non-employees performing work on behalf of an 
enterprise is expressly provided for by article 7:658.4 of the Dutch Civil Code. 
119 In the “standard test” of vicarious liability, it will be noted, the question is narrower: was there a “sufficiently 
close connection” between the perpetrator’s wrongful act and the scope of his personal duties? This applies also 
to the notion of a “functional relationship” between the perpetrator’s conduct and his duties postulated in terms 
of article 6:170 of the Dutch Civil Code.  
120 At 63, quoted in Brodie op cit. In Majrowski (above) the Court of Appeal gave the following example which, 
though couched in the language of vicarious liability, does illustrate the point: “if two employees, neighbours 
perhaps, who have a confrontational relationship outside and unconnected with their work, continue the 
confrontation at work so that one harasses the other, there would be no sufficient[ly] close connection between 
the nature of their employment and the harassment”. 
121 Op cit at 1902–1903. 
122 Ibid at 1903. 
123 I.e., whether the employee committed the wrongful act “in the course and scope of employment”. 
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in Naspers) in judging “the sufficiency of the connection between the employer’s 
creation or enhancement of the risk and a wrong complained of”.124 Indeed, the 
development the “standard test” suggested by Le Roux points towards outcomes 
similar to those of a test based on enterprise liability. As she goes on to observe: 
“Employment relationships have spatial limits and on each occasion it will be for the 
court to determine, with reference to the nature of the job, the specific tasks of the 
employee and the powers and intimacies involved, where the boundaries are.” 
The implications of such an approach was spelled out in Isaacs v Centre Guards t/a 
Town Centre Security:125 
 
“In answering the question in the context of forbidden acts, an important distinction 
is drawn between a prohibition which limits the sphere of employment, on the one 
hand, and one which deals with conduct within the sphere of employment, on the 
other… The general rule is that an employee who disregards a prohibition which 
limits the sphere of his employment is not acting in the course of his employment, 
but an employee who disregards a prohibition which only deals with his conduct 
within the sphere of his employment is not acting outside the course of his 
employment.” 
 
On this basis, Le Roux comments, “there is very little that the employer can do to 
avoid liability in the case of sexual harassment” in respect of conduct “within the 
sphere of employment”; but, while it “may appear unfair”, this approach “serves the 
policy considerations underpinning vicarious liability and is consistent with the 
[employer’s] constitutional duties”.126 
 
For practical purposes, it is submitted, employer liability for employee conduct 
within the “sphere of employment” may be difficult to distinguish from “enterprise 
liability” except on technical grounds. The “sphere of employment” concept, 
however, has the drawback of being confined to “employees”, thus allowing the 
employer to contract out of liability “by recourse to the kinds of private law devices 
that allow a denial of responsibility at common law”.127 Enterprise liability, on the 
other hand, is not dependent on an employment relationship, nor on the creation of 
any special risk by the employer (for example, placing the perpetrator of sexual 
harassment in a position of authority over the victim). Such a fact would merely 
reinforce the victim’s claim. 
 
To sum up: enterprise liability arises from the creation of an enterprise in which 
numerous processes are set in motion and numerous individuals (employees and 
non-employees) engage in complex relationships with one another as well as the 
public at large. Sexual harassment is one of the incidents that may occur in the 
                                                 
124 Whitcher op cit at 1916–1917. See the Bazley judgment at 59ff, cited in Grobler v Naspers (above)  at 516–
517. 
125 [2004] 3 BLLR 288 (C) at par 23, cited by Le Roux op cit at 1904–1905. 
126 Le Roux op cit at 1905. 
127 Brodie op cit. 
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process. If it does, the doctrine implies that the enterprise must escape liability if the 
act of harassment is fundamentally divorced from the conduct of its business. But, if 
such act arises within the sphere of its business activity, the enterprise should be 
accountable for the risk it has created. 
 
Conclusion 
Using the concept of enterprise liability, which answers are suggested to the 
questions that were noted at the outset?  
 
First, enterprise liability does not imply limiting the employer’s liability to acts of 
sexual harassment committed within the workplace or within the scope of the 
perpetrator’s employment. The essential question is whether it occurred as a result 
of the perpetrator’s connection with the business of the enterprise. Thus, for 
example, an enterprise may be liable if a person doing work on its behalf (whether as 
an employee or independent contractor) sexually harasses a co-worker outside the 
workplace or outside working hours provided their relationship arose within the 
context of that work, but not if it arose independently of the enterprise. 
Nor is enterprise liability limited to instances of sexual harassment by senior 
employees of junior employees placed under their authority. Harassment by a 
perpetrator of a co-worker may also render the employer liable if their working 
relationship was a causal factor of the harassment.  
 
As in the “standard test”, enterprise liability is strict but not absolute. The 
implication is that, in creating working relationships among individuals, an employer 
must be mindful of the possibility of sexual harassment and take appropriate 
preventive as well as remedial measures. There may therefore be circumstances 
where an employer should not be held liable – for example, where it does everything 
reasonably possible to prevent sexual harassment and address its consequences.128  
It has been argued that sexual harassment must be seen as a violation of the 
fundamental rights to dignity and equal treatment. This makes it appropriate to 
frame its prohibition in the context of equality legislation (as is the case in South 
Africa and in terms of Directive 2002/73/EC). Given that derogations from 
fundamental rights must be interpreted strictly, it means that employers’ defences to 
victims’ claims must likewise be interpreted strictly, thereby reinforcing the position 
of disempowered claimants. 
 
This does not mean that the prevention of sexual harassment may not, at the same 
time, be treated as an aspect of safety at work. The proviso is only that it may not 
detract from the victim’s right to claim damages from the perpetrator and/or the 
employer or to enforce her right to equal treatment. As in other contexts, the role of 
the state in preventing or sanctioning unlawful conduct (in this case, failure to 
                                                 
128 See, for example, Mokoena & another v Garden Art (Pty) Ltd & another [2008] JOL 21227 (LC). Were the 
employer to be liable for patrimonial and sentimental damages irrespective of its efforts to prevent sexual 
harassment, it is arguable that an employer would have little incentive to take preventive action. 
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provide safe working conditions) should be seen separately from a victim’s 
entitlement to redress for injury suffered as a result of such conduct. This, broadly 
speaking, is the position in the Netherlands. While the WCA allows the labour 
inspectorate to enforce the measures in respect of sexual harassment required by the 
Act, victims are able to recover compensation in terms of the relevant provisions of 
the Civil Code.129  
 
In South Africa, as noted above, the equivalent safety legislation is inappropriate. In 
the event that sexual harassment is considered an “accident” for purposes of the 
statute, employer liability would be excluded. This would strike at the root of any 
policy aimed at encouraging employers to accept responsibility sexual harassment in 
the workplace. On the other hand, the Employment Equity Act likewise provides for 
intervention by the labour inspectorate to enforce certain of its requirements, 
including the duty of designated employers to take measures to eliminate sexual 
harassment. This does not exclude victims’ right to claim damages or compensation 
for the unfair discrimination they have suffered. 
 
Such a combination of administrative action to combat sexual harassment and 
victims’ personal right to claim damages for the consequences of harassment, it may 
be concluded, is appropriate. It is also appropriate that the test of enterprise liability 
should be used in determining an employer’s or enterprise’s liability for such 
harassment. Such an approach, it is submitted, would go some way towards 
promoting the purpose of the doctrine of employer liability: that is, to encourage 
employers to meet the standard of social responsibility that is expected of them. 
                                                 
129 On the advantages of administrative enforcement by means of the labour inspectorate over litigation, see 
Simone Timman “Seksuele intimidatie en wetgeving” Quality Matters (juli 2004) 7 available at http://www.e-
quality.nl.  
